A Short Argument for the Existence of Mind

The following argument comes to us courtesy of philosopher Jay Richards at Mind Matters. It's an argument for the proposition that in addition to our material brain we also have an immaterial mind involved in our cognitive experience.

Here goes:

Imagine a scenario where I ask you to think about eating a chocolate ice cream sundae, while a doctor does an MRI and takes a real-time scan of your brain state. We assume that the following statements are true:

(1) You’re a person. You have a “first person perspective.”
(2) You have thoughts.
(3) I asked you to think about eating a chocolate ice cream sundae.
(4) You freely chose to do so, based on my request.
(5) Those thoughts caused something to happen in your brain and perhaps elsewhere in your body.

Thinking about the sundae causes patterns of brain waves, but brain waves are simply electrochemical goings-on in the brain. They're not the same thing as your thoughts. They're not about anything, but your thoughts are. They're about the sundae.

Richards goes on:

We have thoughts and ideas — what philosophers call “intentional” states — that are about things other than themselves. We don’t really know how this works, how it relates to the brain or chemistry or the laws of physics .... But whenever we speak to another person, we assume it must be true. And in our own case, we know it’s true. Even to deny it is to affirm it.

Richards next observes that there's no dispute about points (1) through (5). They're common sense.

In other words, everyone who hasn’t been persuaded by skeptical philosophy assumes them to be true. But it’s not merely that everyone assumes them. They are basic to pretty much any other intellectual exercise, including arguing.

That’s because you have direct access to your thoughts and, by definition, to your first-person perspective. You know these things more directly than you could conclude, let alone know, any truth of history or science. You certainly know them more directly than you could possibly know the premises of an argument for materialism.

That matters because (1) through (5) defy materialist explanation.

So how might a materialist respond?

The materialist will want to say one of three things to avoid the implication of a free agent whose thoughts cause things to happen in the material world:

A) Your “thoughts” are identical to a physical brain state.
B) Your “thoughts” are determined by a physical brain state.
or
C) You don’t really have thoughts.

And if any one of (A), (B), or (C) is true, then most or all of (1) through (5) are false.

Richards concludes with this:

So here’s the conclusion: What possible reason could we have for believing (A), (B), or (C) and doubting (1) through (5)? Remember that if you opt for (A), (B), or (C), you can’t logically presuppose (1) through (5).

Surely this alone is enough to conclude that we can have no good reason for believing the materialist account of the mind.