The media appear delirious over the possibility of civil war in Iraq. Everywhere we turn we're told the Iraqis are "on the verge" of a full scale collapse into war between Shia and Sunni. This may be, but, as usual, the media is long on hysteria and short on analysis. For the latter we need to turn to the blogosphere where Bill Roggio breaks down the criteria for civil war. He lists the following indicators:
1) The Shiite United Iraqi Alliance no longer seeks to form a unity government and marginalize the Shiite political blocks.
2) Sunni political parties withdraw from the political process.
3) Kurds make hard push for independence/full autonomy.
4) Grand Ayatollah Sistani ceases calls for calm, no longer takes a lead role in brokering peace.
5) Muqtada al-Sadr becomes a leading voice in Shiite politics.
6) Major political figures - Shiite and Sunni - openly call for retaliation.
7) The Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party and Muslim Scholars Association openly call for the formation of Sunni militias.
8) Interior Ministry ceases any investigations into torture and death squads, including the case against recently uncovered problems with the Highway Patrol.
9) Defense Minister Dulaimi (a Sunni) is asked to step down from his post.
10) Iraqi Security Forces begins severing ties with the Coalition, including:
Disembeddeding the Military Transition Teams.
Requests U.S. forces to vacate Forward Operating Bases / Battle Positions in Western and Northern Iraq.
Alienates Coalition at training academies.
11) Iraqi Security Forces make no effort to quell violence or provide security in Sunni neighborhoods.
12) Iraqi Security Forces actively participate in attacks on Sunnis, with the direction of senior leaders in the ministries of Defense or Interior.
13) Shiite militias are fully mobilized, with the assistance of the government, and deployed to strike at Sunni targets. Or, the Shiite militias are fully incorporated into the Iraqi Security Forces without certification from Coalition trainers.
14) Sunni military officers are dismissed en masse from the Iraqi Army.
15) Kurdish officers and soldiers leave their posts and return to Kurdistan, and reform into Peshmerga units.
16) Attacks against other religious shrines escalate, and none of the parties make any pretense about caring.
17) Coalition military forces pull back from forward positions to main regional bases.
As Roggio notes, as of yet none of these things have happened, and the media's hysteria is thus appallingly, but unsurprisingly, premature.