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Saturday, April 23, 2022

Deterring Nuclear War

Robert C. O’Brien is a former national security advisor (2019-2021) and current CEO of American Global Strategies, LLC. He had a column in the Wall Street Journal (paywall) this week in which he outlined a strategy for avoiding nuclear war with Russia over Ukraine.

He wrote:
If Ukrainian forces push Russia out of the Donbas and even Crimea, there would be no way for Mr. Putin to hide Russia’s humiliating loss from its people. If such an outcome became likely, would he use one of his thousands of “tactical” or “battlefield” nuclear devices to take out Kharkiv, Odessa or even Kyiv in an attempt to save face and end the war on terms he dictates?

This possibility is surely on the minds of President Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, and his staff.

The time is now to deter Russia from “escalating to de-escalate.” The U.S. must unambiguously communicate to Moscow what lies ahead if it goes down this terrible path.

Mr. Putin and his supporters need to understand that if he detonates a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the U.S. response will be swift and significant—far exceeding the limited export sanctions under consideration around the world in response to Russian atrocities in Bucha.
O’Brien does not suggest that, in the event of a nuclear strike against Ukraine, we, or NATO, retaliate against Russia with nuclear weapons of our own, but the U.S. should be prepared to take other serious actions quickly. He goes on to list several options:
  • Clear the Russian navy’s two remaining Slava-class cruisers, their escort ships and submarines from the Mediterranean. This could be accomplished by a diplomatic démarche followed by more-forceful action if necessary to enforce compliance.
  • Eliminate Russian air and military assets in Syria and Libya on the same basis. The U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have the ability to do so fully within hours if Russia refuses to withdraw its forces to its homeland.
  • Entirely dismantle all pipelines used to transport Russian oil and gas to the West, quashing even the hope of future sales to Europe. Military assets could assist civilian engineering companies to accomplish this task with dispatch.
  • Advise all non-Western nations, including China, that purchasing Russian oil would result in massive punitive tariffs by the U.S., Japan and the European Union that would effectively decouple their economies from the industrial world.
  • End Russian dreams of earning hard currency by servicing Iran’s nuclear industry. The idea that the West would stand by while Iran develops its own tactical nuclear capacity should be dismissed. The U.S., Israel and their Arab allies would be positioned to give the ayatollahs a short window to completely dismantle Iran’s nuclear program under an intrusive inspection regime.

    If the ayatollahs decline, as they likely would, the key elements of Iran’s nuclear program could be dismantled by the full air power of the regional alliance arrayed against them.
Mr. O'Brien notes that these are only some of the steps that could be taken if Mr. Putin employs nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but that the urgent priority is to communicate them to the Kremlin now.

To not dissuade Putin from the use of tactical nuclear weapons now is to risk an escalation that could ultimately involve the entire world in nuclear war:
The same strong and well-messaged deterrence that kept the free world safe from nuclear attack during the long years of the Cold War must be restored to avert a nuclear tragedy in Ukraine. If it isn’t, the risk of Russian miscalculation will rise—as will the even greater risk of nuclear escalation beyond Ukraine.
Of course, if either of the first two steps were employed, then we'd certainly be at war with Russia and it would certainly involve nuclear weapons.

Better to let Putin know that that's where his first use of nukes in Ukraine would take us than to let him think that he could get away with using them.