Is the Concept of God Incoherent? (Pt. III)

In the previous two posts I argued that Philosopher Peter Atterton failed in his attempt to show that there's a contradiction between God's goodness and the evil in the world and that his conclusion that the theist's concept of God is incoherent is unwarranted.

Atterton is not finished, however. He next turns his attention to another alleged contradiction, the supposed incompatibility between God's omniscience and His moral perfection:

What about God’s infinite knowledge — His omniscience? Philosophically, this presents us with no less of a conundrum.

Leaving aside the highly implausible idea that God knows all the facts in the universe, no matter how trivial or useless (Saint Jerome thought it was beneath the dignity of God to concern Himself with such base questions as how many fleas are born or die every moment), if God knows all there is to know, then He knows at least as much as we know.

But if He knows what we know, then this would appear to detract from His perfection. Why?

There are some things that we know that, if they were also known to God, would automatically make Him a sinner, which of course is in contradiction with the concept of God. As the late American philosopher Michael Martin has already pointed out, if God knows all that is knowable, then God must know things that we do, like lust and envy.

But one cannot know lust and envy unless one has experienced them. But to have had feelings of lust and envy is to have sinned, in which case God cannot be morally perfect.

Atterton is here committing the fallacy of equivocation, slyly using the word "know" in two different senses.

He first uses "know" propositionally, e.g. as someone might "know" who won the 1980 World Series, but then he gives the word an experiential meaning, as in one may "know" the pleasure of a fine wine.

When philosophers talk of God's omniscience they're speaking of propositional knowledge. God knows all true propositions. Omniscience doesn't entail that God knows what something like guilt or lust feels like experientially.

Nevertheless, I'd argue that it certainly seems possible that God knows very well what lust feels like without himself ever having experienced it, just as he can know what sweetness is like without ever having tasted anything sweet or what red would look like before he ever created light or eyes to see it with.

After all, if God designed and created man's emotions and sensations it's reasonable to think that He has an exhaustive understanding of what he has created even if he himself never has the experiences that give rise to those sensations in humans.

If this is possible then Atterton has not demonstrated a contradiction between God's omniscience and moral perfection and has therefore failed again to show that there's an incoherence in the theist's concept of God. His argument is very unpersuasive.