Rebecca Goldstein recalls with fondness Baruch Spinoza's dream of founding ethics on reason. She concludes her essay with these words:
Spinoza had argued that our capacity for reason is what makes each of us a thing of inestimable worth, demonstrably deserving of dignity and compassion. That each individual is worthy of ethical consideration is itself a discoverable law of nature, obviating the appeal to divine revelation. An idea that had caused outrage when Spinoza first proposed it in the 17th century, adding fire to the denunciation of him as a godless immoralist, had found its way into the minds of men who set out to create a government the likes of which had never before been seen on this earth.
Well, not exactly. The Founding Fathers valued the virtues that Goldstein and Spinoza praise, but they realized that those virtues cannot ultimately be based upon reason. They can only be based upon the will and nature of a transcendent Creator. Reason can tell us how best to accomplish some goal, but it cannot tell us whether the goal itself is good or right. If one's goal, for example, is to set up a government wherein all men are equal then reason might be able to inform us of the most effective way of going about achieving that goal, but it cannot tell us that the goal itself is any better or more right than establishing a state wherein some men are slaves.
Contra Spinoza the proposition that "each individual is worthy of ethical consideration" is not a law of nature. Nature nowhere imposes upon us a duty to assign worth to other human beings. The ethical law of nature, if there is one, is that each of us should look to our own interests. Nature teaches that life is every man for himself. The only basis anyone has for imputing dignity and worth to others is the conviction that all men are created in the image of God, that each of us belongs to and is loved by God. He demands that each of us respect what is His, the objects of His love. If there is no God, as Goldstein seems to hope, then human beings are no different than cattle, a herd of animals to be manipulated, exploited and slaughtered by whomever has the power and the desire to do so.
Not only must moral value ultimately be grounded in a transcendent God if it is to have any existence at all, but so, too, must our confidence in reason itself. If all we are is material stuff, chemical reactions, then what grounds do we have for believing that our cognitive faculties are reliable? They have evolved to suit us for survival, not to lead us to truth. Sometimes reason produces truth, sometimes it leads to error. What grounds do we have for trusting it if all it is is a series of biochemical reactions occuring in nerve cells in the brain? Unless there is a God who has created us and instilled in us the cognitive apparatus required to discover truth we have no basis for thinking that any belief we hold on the basis of reason is correct. Indeed, in order to argue that reason is trustworthy we have to employ our reason, and thus we must assume the very thing we're trying to prove. The only appropriate philosophy for the materialist is a radical skepticism about everything.
Goldstein wishes to be a skeptic about God but not about reason, but people like her delude themselves if they think that human reason is the key that enables them to shed the chains of theistic belief. Autonomous reason, unanchored to theistic belief, is like a mirage which appears substantial enough until it is approached, at which point it just seems to evanesce. Trust in reason alone, if pursued all the way to the end, winds up in nihilism and despair.
