Thursday, May 2, 2019

Judeo-Christian Ethics (Pt. II)

Yesterday's post summarized some of the shortcomings of any system of ethics or morality based on a naturalistic worldview. It would be a mistake to conclude from this discussion, however, that a person who embraces that worldview can't be a morally "good" person. That's demonstrably false.

Rather, the problem for the naturalist (one who believes that only nature exists - that there's no supernatural) is that the values they choose to live by are purely arbitrary and subjective. The naturalist may choose to be a kind, generous, honest individual, but had she chosen instead to be cruel, selfish or dishonest her choices wouldn't be wrong in any objective moral sense, they'd just be different.

So, if naturalistic ethics are unsatisfactory in the ways mentioned yesterday what's the alternative? What advantages, and disadvantages, does a theistic ethics offer?

Here are some advantages of theism-based ethics or what are usually called Divine Command ethics. I'll have particularly in mind the Judeo-Christian version of Divine Command ethics in what follows:

First, Judeo-Christian ethics supply us with a non-arbitrary source of objective principles of right and wrong grounded in a transcendent, personal moral authority. They provide a basis for both objective moral duties and moral absolutes. Right and wrong are not merely the subjective preferences of individual humans or of any society of humans, but are expressions of the nature and will of a perfectly good, omnipotent Being.

Secondly, Judeo-Christian ethics offer an answer to the egoist's challenge to anyone who advocates some ethical system to state a reason as to why and how it would be wrong to always place one's own interests ahead of the interests of others. It also provides a ground for rejecting the ethic of "might makes right."

Moreover, Judeo-Christian ethics tells us that we're accountable to God for how we live, that our lives will be judged. Only if such is the case can there really be any moral obligation to live one way rather than another. If death is the end of our existence, as it is on naturalism, then the choices we make in this life have no ultimate moral significance.

Judeo-Christian ethics also affords a basis for believing that human worth, dignity, and rights are not mere illusions or fictions but actually exist. Judeo-Christian ethics are predicated on the doctrine that we are created by God in His image and that we are loved by Him. Our rights and worth flow from this relationship, a relationship affirmed by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence where he wrote that, "all men are created equal," and that we are "endowed by our Creator with certain unalienable rights..."

Of course, despite these advantages there are difficulties with Judeo-Christian ethics as well.

For instance, they would have no purchase with someone who rejects the idea that there exists a perfectly qualified source of moral truth and obligation, a personal Deity who has the power to hold us accountable. If someone is skeptical of the existence of a Divine Commander Divine Command ethics will not appear to be a compelling option.

Another problem with Judeo-Christian ethics is that they're based on the assumption that God has revealed moral truth to us and has told us how we are to live. One could, perhaps, believe that God exists but be dubious that God has revealed moral truth to us.

Even if we accept that there is such a revelation from God - scripture or conscience, for example - we have to assume that we're interpreting correctly what that revelation tells us about morality.

Finally, the most popular objection to Divine Command ethics, whether Christian or any other sort, is something called the Euthyphro Dilemma. I've written about this argument elsewhere and explained there why I (in the company of many philosophers of religion) think it fails, so I won't go into an analysis of it here. Readers who may be interested in the topic can find my three part discussion here, here and here.

It must be kept in mind in all this that even if someone believes that there is a God it doesn't follow that he or she will know what's right, and even if one does know what's right it doesn't follow that he or she will do what's right.

But the point that needs to be stressed is that there can be objective moral right only if there is a God. If there is no God then philosopher our moral judgments are merely expressions of our own personal taste or, as philosopher A.J. Ayer said, “[S]entences which simply express moral judgments do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood.”

Tomorrow I'll share some cursory thoughts on what I think we can infer about the nature of moral right and wrong from Judeo-Christian ethics.