The maxim by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings is ... that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments we ought to give preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations.Hume intended these assertions to serve as part of his argument against the reasonableness of believing in miracles, but what he didn't foresee and what many of his skeptical votaries don't see today is how acceptance of this maxim undercuts belief in naturalistic theories of both cosmogenesis (origin of the cosmos) and biogenesis (origin of life).
In fact, Intelligent Design advocates use an argument similar to Hume's maxim to buttress their claim that the universe and living things should both be seen as products of intelligent agency.
Whenever we encounter machines, information, or extraordinarily precise calibrations of some kind we infer them to be the result of the causal agency of a mind. We have no experience of information like that found in a book coming into existence apart from a mind nor do we have experience of complex machines like outboard motors coming into existence apart from the work of an intelligent engineer or mechanic.
So, if we follow Hume's maxim we should attribute the enormous amount of information carried on the DNA of every cell in our bodies or the breathtaking complexity of cellular machines like bacterial flagella or ATP synthase to intelligent agency, yet for some reason, the same folks who invoke Hume in arguing against miracles suspend Hume''s maxim when it comes to explaining both the finely-tuned universe and information-laden living organisms.
If it's true that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable, and if we should always believe what's more probable than what's less probable, and if we have a uniform experience of information and complex machinery resulting solely from intelligent activity, then it follows that we should attribute the origin of DNA, cellular machines, and cosmic fine-tuning to a mind.
The Humean can't have it both ways. If, as Hume insists in the Inquiry, "a uniform experience amounts to a proof," then our uniform experience of information, complex machinery and precisely fine-tuned calibrations being produced by a mind should amount to a proof that similar phenomena in the structure of both living cells and the cosmos should amount to a proof that living cells and the cosmos are both the creations of a mind.
Here are a couple of videos of cellular machines that illustrate their astonishing design:
A man may believe that these machines are somehow the product of blind, unguided forces if he chooses, but one who does so choose can scarcely claim intellectual superiority over those who believe in other kinds of miracles than does he.
