Friday, July 27, 2018

An Atheist's Dilemma

Alfredo Metere is a senior research scientist at the International Computer Science Institute, and the University of California, Berkeley.

In an article at Cosmos he argues that the laws of physics leave no room for free will, that the universe is a deterministic system, and that all human choices were made inevitable by the initial conditions which prevailed at the Big Bang.

Here are some key excerpts from his argument:
One of the major fundamental questions in physics concerns the presence or absence of free will in the universe, or in any physical system, or subset, within it.

Physics is based on the idea that nature is mechanistic, which means that it works like a machine. A machine is just a system, and therefore, by definition, it is a collection of elements, each of them with a specific, possibly different function, all working together to achieve a specific purpose, general to the whole machine.

If we believe in the Big Bang Theory – and the universe’s continuous expansion is a strong indication that such theory must be correct – the initial state of the universe was a single point (known as a singularity) that then expanded to the cosmos we know and perceive today, which, of course, includes us.

If so, there is a causal relationship between the Big Bang and us. In other words, free will is not allowed, and all of our actions are just a mere consequence of that first event. Such a view is known as “determinism”, or “super-determinism” (if one finds it productive to reinvent the wheel).
Set aside the objection to Metere that according to quantum physics the universe is fundamentally indeterminate (See the argument developed at Evolution News by Michael Egnor), and bear in mind that most metaphysical naturalists are inclined to agree with Metere's analysis. Naturalism entails, though perhaps not strictly, a materialist view of reality, and materialism entails, though perhaps not strictly, a determinist view of human volition.

Atheism, materialism and determinism all cluster together so that those who hold one view, generally hold the other two as well. If they don't, they have to somehow reconcile what appears prima facie to be an inconsistency.

Now consider the awkward dilemma this places an atheist (metaphysical naturalist) in.

If atheism is true then materialism follows. Everything is ultimately reducible to, and explicable in terms of, material particles and the forces between them. And if materialism is true then determinism is true. There's no locus for free will in a purely material substrate like the brain.

Our choices are chemical reactions in our brain, and those reactions are caused by other chemical reactions, and so on back to the Big Bang.

All of those reactions are determined, so as Metere says, there's a causal relation between us and the Big Bang, and there's no room for any "choice" occurring outside that causal chain. But, if determinism is true then our beliefs are the product of non-rational chemical reactions, a coupling and decoupling of particles.

If that's so, then the belief that atheism is true is alo non-rational, so why should anyone believe it? Some people have the appropriate chemical reactions that lead to atheistic belief and others don't, but in neither case does the objective truth of things factor into the picture.

It might be objected that our beliefs are formed by reasons which stimulate the appropriate chemical reactions, but this is also problematic.

Our reasons are themselves ultimately determined by chemical reactions, so if our reasons are determined then we don't necessarily hold them because of their truth value, but because of a host of other causes, most of which are unknown and unknowable, and perhaps all of which are non-rational.

Moreover, reasons are ideas, and ideas are immaterial. How does a materialist account for the efficacy of immaterial ideas acting on material atoms and molecules to produce an immaterial belief?

Metere closes with this:
[O]ne can be tempted to interject that if free will does not exist, why do we punish criminals? It is not their fault, after all. A counter-argument to that is that punishment is the natural response to crime, such that global equilibrium can be sustained, and therefore punishment is just as unavoidable as the commission of wrongdoing.
In other words, the criminal commits a crime because he was determined to do so by the initial conditions of the Big Bang, and society's authorities punish him because they were determined to do so also by the initial conditions of the Big Bang.

If this is true then there's no real culpability, no moral responsibility, no right or wrong, and, if there is no God, no ultimate accountability. On this view, whatever is, is right, or at least not really wrong. In fact, on this view right and wrong simply mean what people with power like and what people with power don't like. That road leads to slavery and Auschwitz.

I wonder, if someone were to rape his daughter or torture his son to death, if Metere would think that it wasn't really objectively wrong. Perhaps he would, I don't know.

Metere is a very bright guy, so I'm sure he has answers to these questions. I just wish he would have included them in his essay.